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TRANSFER OF RULE-MAKING POWER FROM
LEGISLATIVE TO JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
A RESPONSIBILITY OF THE BAR
FRANCIS E. WINSLOW*

Until actually called into government service, a lawyer can best
serve his country in this dire crisis by giving the best service of which
he is capable to his clients and community, and coperating with other
lawyers in making the tools with which he works sharper, more efficient, and more productive. So long as the work of the organized bar
is not permitted to interfere with the actual promotion of the war effort,
such activity, usefully directed, cannot but be an aid to the war effort.
When the whole democratic system is threatened with extinction because
of its alleged inefficiency, the lawyer can engage in no more useful work
in 'defense of democracy than to coperate with his fellows in an earnest
effort to eliminate waste, lost motion, and monkey wrenches, from the

judicial machinery established by the people and for the people.
THE PUBLIC HOLDS THE BAR RESPONSIBLE FOR DELAYS AND EXPENSES
OF LITIGATION AND MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE

The man in the street believes that the judicial machinery of this
State is more cumbersome, more awkward, more inefficient, more
wasteful of time and money, than it need be. This view is so widely
held and evokes such a feeling of aversion to any contact with the law
or lawyers, that businessmen, disgusted because nothing is being done
to remedy the situation by the present rule-making authority, the General Assembly, have learned to avoid contact with the courts as if they
were infected with a plague. More compromises and adjustments of
differences are due to fear of "getting into court," and "being soaked
by lawyers," than by bona fide evaluation of the relative strength of
claims and defenses. "An Englishman standing upon a right" will not
give an inch to tyrannical government, or a foreign oppressor, but his
American descendant has enough Scotch or Latin blood in him to
shrewdly find ways to sidestep conflicts with his fellow man which
involve what he considers unnecessary inconvenience and expense,
which are conducted like a sporting match or game, and which are too
frequently decided on sympathy or prejudice rather than the weight
of the evidence. Where the possibility of controversy can be foreseen,
as in business contracts, the practice of substituting arbitration for the
* Member of the Bar of Rocky Mount, N. C.; past President of the North
Carolina Bar' Association.
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courts has grown rapidly in recent years. Cotton contracts were
fertile fields of litigation some years ago in textile centers like Charlotte. Arbitration has for a long time now taken all this business away
from the lawyers and the courts. The new motion picture industry
has armed itself against the lawyers by the same device. Property
insurance contracts long ago pointed the way. The General Assembly
of North Carolina, while unwilling to take any important step about
improving court procedure, has encouraged arbitration by law., In
wide areas of non-contractual relationships, administrative boards or
commissions are substituted for both arbitration and courts, as in the
Workmens Compensation Law, and the proposed Automobile Liability
Law. In practically all that broad field of law comprised in modern
social legislation regulating industrial employment and such matters, and
in legislation regulating transportation, the courts get only such controversies as survive the winnowing-out process of administrative procedure, which has been made a necessary prerequisite to court action,
e.g., Railway Labor Act,2 and the North Carolina laws regulating
buses. The trend for years has been and still is to starve the courts
and their officers, that is to say, the lawyers. Some part of the growth
of administrative law must fairly be ascribed to the better adaptation
of administrative procedure for the enforcement of new statutes dealing
with the complexities of modern life. But tiissatisfaction with the
procedure of the courts is responsible for a substantial part of such
growth.
If the starving of the lawyers were all there is to it, the public
might be well satisfied with the process and the progress made. The
lawyers are a small group, and getting smaller. No matter how much
the public has admired lawyers for their individual worth, it has never
loved them as a class. However, other factors are involved. The
irreducible minimum of litigation which remains in spite of the starving
out process is still enough to irritate the public. Men and women who
are required to leave their regular pursuits and attend courts as jurors,
litigants, or witnesses find their time wasted by unexpected continuances,
or mistrials for surprise, which could have been avoided by a few simple
but adequate procedural rules, such as for pretrial hearings or discovery. If the case is tried, they find much lost motion due to arguments
on amendments to pleadings and the form of issues, and still more time
and money actually wasted in proof of facts which should have been
admitted, all of which should have been saved by a pretrial hearing.
If the case is decided, there may be a new trial for a procedural reason
not affecting the real merits of the case or the fairness of the trial, such
'PuB. LAWS oF N. C., 1927, Chap. 94, N. C. CoDE ANNT. (Michie, 1939) §898.
54 STAT. 756, 758, 45 U. S. C. A. §151 et seq.
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as that the judge has no power to reserve his decision on a motion for
nonsuit until after verdict,3 or that the judge has no power to complete
a- verdict as to an issue which neither party had thought sufficiently
important to tender,4 and so on. These are but examples of a horde
of procedural technicalities. Not infrequently there are four or five
such new trials in one case.5 After one such experience, the litigants
involved on both sides usually take a solemn oath "never again," the
lawyers on both sides lose clients, and both litigants and lawyers lose
money, and witnesses and the public generally are disgusted with the
law.
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IS NOT AN EFFICIENT RULE-MAKING BODY

The instances just mentioned merely illustrate some of the defects
which have been disclosed in the operation of our legislative Code of
Civil Procedure in the course of its seventy-five years' reign as the
ruler of our trial courts. They do not constitute an indictment of the
Code as such; but, rather, reflect on those factors which have caused
the Code to become too inflexible to meet the demands of modern
litigation. Its formulation by David Dudley Field about one hundred
Years ago, as adopted by us in 1868, was a definite forwvard step away
from the refinements of common-law pleading, and toward the simplicity of equity pleading. If the General Assembly had had a David
Dudley Field as its technical advisor during all the intervening years,
and had allowed him to keep the machinery cleaned up and lubricated
and repaired as the need appeared, we would have long since had rules
for pretrial practice to eliminate continuances and mistrials for surprise
and to shorten trials by closing the pleadings against further amendment
and by simplifying the issues by stipulations as to uncontroverted facts,
etc. ;6 we would have had modernized discovery to take the edge off
lawyers who try a lawsuit as they play a game and love the trick
plays ;7 we would have had a rule that motion for nonsuit or directed
verdict could be renewed after verdict, to save a new trial in case the
ruling should be reversed on appeal;8 we would have had a rule that
when neither party tenders a minor issue, and the jury returns a verdict
which is incomplete because of such oversight, the judge can complete
'Batson

v. City Laundry Co., 202 N. C. 560, 163 S. E. 600 (1932) ; Batson V.

City Laundry Co., 205 N. C. 93, 170 S. E. 136 (1933) ; Batson v. City Laundry
Co., 206 N. C. 371, 174 S. E. 90 (1934); Batson v. City Laundry Co., 209 N. C.
223, 183 S. E. 413 (1936).
'Tucker v. Satherwaite, 120 N. C. 118, 27 S. E. 45 (1897).
See note 3 supra.
"RULES CIVIL PROCEDURE, U. S. D. C., Rule 16.
RULES CIVIL PROCEDURE, U. S. D. C., Rules 26-37, inc'l.
RULES FOR LAW AND EQurrx,,
8

NEW MARYLAND
ANN. CODE OF MD. (Flack, 1939), Art. 16, §171.

RULES CIVIL PROCEDURE, U. S. D.

Trial Rule 4.

C., Rule 50(b); NEW MARYLAND RULES,
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the verdict, to save a new trial.9 The few amendments just mentioned
would take care of all the fiascos described above. Every one of them
has been adopted in other jurisdictions, by court rule, with excellent
results, but none of them has been even considered in North Carolina
by the present rule-making authority, the General Assembly. The
North Carolina General Assembly has had only one expert advisor on
rules, David Dudley Field, and he has been dead for several generations.
His dynamic Code has become a dead engine for want of an engineer.
It is not the Code which is to blame. It is the lack of power to change
and adapt itself to changing times that is at the root of our troubles
today.
Without an expert in whom it had confidence, the General Assembly has been paralyzed in its work upon the Code. It has made a few
amendments in the past seventy-five years; some good, but most of
them bad-conceived in the wrath of some lawmaker who has lost a
case-unskillfully drawn, and ill-fitted into the general scheme; These
changes, instead of mending, too often marred the symmetry of the
whole, and produced worse ills than those they were intended to cure. 1° *
The General Assembly has its attention fixed on matters other than
court procedure. Its members meet ' once in two years; there is a large
turnover in its make-up; and no one is ever elected to that body because of his competency and learning in adjective law. Not knowing
for sure whether proposed amendments will work for good or evil, and
having no authority to turn to for sound advice, it "plays safe" by
voting them all down, leaving the courts as rigidly bound as before.
THE SUPREME COURT WITH AN ADVISORY COMMITTEE WOULD BE THE
MOST COMPETENT RULE-MAKING AUTHORITY TO STUDY AND

ADOPT ALL PROCEDURAL CHANGES
Realizing that such paralysis of legislative bodies is inherent in their

nature and function, other jurisdictions have turned the whole matter
over to the most competent rule-makers in their respective realms, towit, the courts of last resort. Nine states had taken this step prior to
1934-Michigan, n1 New Jersey, 12 Delaware, 13 Washington, 14 Florida, 15

I RULES CIVIL PROCED RE, U. S. D. C., Rule 49(a); NEW MARYLAND RULES,
Trial Rule 7.
0 Mr. Justice Cardozo once stated the case against legislative tinkering when
he said: "The Legislature, informed only casually and intermittently of the needs

and problems of the courts, without expert or responsible or disinterested or
systematic advice as to the workings of one rule or another, patches the fabric
here and there, and mars often vhen it would mend:' Mitchell, Reform in Audicial
Procedure (1938) 24 AM. BAR Ass'N. J. 197.

" MIcH. CONST. Art. VI, §5.
" REv. CODE (Star, 1935), §4643.

1

12
14

REV. STAT. (1937), §2:27-149.3.
REy. STAT. (Rem., 1931), §13-1.

Petition of Florida State Bar Ass'n. for Promulgation of New Florida Rules

of Civil Procedure, 199 So. 57 (1940).
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In
Wisconsin,16 Rhode Island,' 7 Tennessee, 18 and New Mexico. 10
Florida the method adopted was later held unconstitutional, and the
work has to be done over again in that state. Of the other eight, five
have done effective work because they have had either a judicial council
or a rules committee to assist the court. In those states where there is
no judicial council and no advisory committee little has been accomplished. In 1934 the Congress authorized the Supreme Court of the
United States to make all the rules for civil actions in the United
States District Courts. 20 The Supreme Court developed the technique
of modern rule-making through appointment of an advisory committee,
including persons who had studied the procedural systems of all the
jurisdictions of the English-speaking world. The result, adopted by
the court, and made effective in 1938, closely followed the plan of the
Field code, but contained a great many important improvements such
as Field, himself, probably would have made had he lived. In 1941 the
Supreme Court reappointed its advisory committee to function as a
continuing body to consider any and all changes proposed by any responsible source, including the court itself. Thus the technique has
been established by the highest court in the land. The new Federal
rules have been deemed by qualified experts to be the best set of rules
yet devised in any English-speaking jurisdiction. 21 The Federal rules
provide for pretrial hearings, for discovery, for renewal of motion for
directed verdicts, for findings by the court in the absence of issues
tendered, and numerous devices for preventing new trials on technicalities where one fair trial has been had. 22 If defects are disclosed in the
present rules, the continuing advisory committee will call them to the
attention of the Supreme Court, and they may be remedied without
asking the Senate and the House of Representatives to lay aside other
business more important to the nation, to pass a bill relating to such
details.
Since 1934 the opinion that the court can be trusted to do a better
job of rule-making than the legislature has jelled rapidly. Since that
date nine states have followed the Federal precedent-West Virginia, 2288
7
25
Indiana, 26 Arizona,2 Colorado,
South Dakota, 24 Pennsylvania,
17GEN. LAWS R. I. 1938, Ch. 497, §7.
11
STAT. Wis. 1937, §251.18.
18 TENN. CODE ANN. (Williams, 1934), §10331.
§34-501.
29 STAT. N. M. (Supp. 1938),
2048 STAT. 1064, 28 U. S. C. A. §§723(b), 723(c) (1927).
21

Senior Circuit Judge J. J. Parker, Fourth Circuit, United States Circuit

Court of Appeals.

Parker, Improving the Administration of Jrtice (1941)

2 See notes 6, 7, 8, and 9 stpra.
Ass'N. J. 71.
23 W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1937), §5183.
24
LAws OF S. DAN. 1937, Ch. 60, §2.
25 PURDON'S PENN. STATUTES (1930), Title 17, par. 61.
20 BURNS INDIANA STATUTES (1937), §2-4718.
27 ARIZ. CODE ANN. (Bobbs-Merril, 1939), §19-202.
28 COL. STATUTES ANN. (Bradford-Robinson, 1935), C. 39, §444.

Am.

BAR

27
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Maryland, 29 Nebraska,30 and Texas.3 1 All of these states followed the
new technique and have either a judicial council or an advisory committee to do the spade work for the court. One of these states, Arizona,
on January 1, 1940, adopted the new Federal rules as its own rules,
with changes in numbering and some other slight revisions to fit local
conditions. The bar of Virginia is working on a bill to give the rulemaking power to the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, and on February 16, 1942, the bill passed the House of Delegates, but failed in
the Senate, after the judges of the court issued a statement of
disapproval.
In North Carolina, Judge L. R. Varser sponsored a similar bill in
1921, but it passed only with emasculating amendments, 2 which failed
to improve the situation. In 1927 the North Carolina Judicial Council
33
recommended a bill to the General Assembly, but it was ignored, and
the Council was abolished in 1931. In 1938 the North Carolina Bar
Association sponsored the movement and submitted a bill to the General Assembly of 1939, and, again, to the General Assembly of 1941.
The latter two bills followed the technique developed by the Supreme
Court of the United States, providing for an advisory commission to
function continuously, 4 but these bills also failed of passage.
OPPOSITION IN THE LEGISLATURE

In the General Assembly the lay-members were willing to follow
the lawyer members, but the lawyer members were so 'divided that the
lay-members were without leadership. The lawyer members of the
legislature who opposed the bill in 1939 and 1941 gave various reasons
for their opposition. One said that since the next legislature could
repeal the law, if passed, why pass it? Another said that if the bill
were passed the next legislature could not repeal it, and therefore he
opposed it. Several said that the change would repeal all they knew
of procedure, and they would have to learn it all over again. Of
course a lawyer must always keep a weather eye open for changes,
whether made by legislature or court. Under the proposed bill changes
could not be made oftener than once in two years. Hearin&s must be
had on proposed changes, and publication of all changes must be made
in the Advance Sheets of the Supreme Court Reports both before and
after they are made. Only after adoption by the Supreme Court and
(Flack, 1939), Art. 26, §35.
11 ANN. CODE OFOFMD.
NEB. (1939 Supp.), §27-231.
10 ComP. STAT.
31
REVISED CIVIL STATUTES OF TEXAs, Art. 1731a.
='Ptm. LAws OF N. C., ExTRA SEss. 1921, C. 92, §20, N. C.

CODE ANN.

(Michie, 1939), §1421 (a).
31 (1928) 30 N. C. BAR Ass'N. REPORTS 142.
0'1939 Bill, 41 N. C. BAR Ass'N. REPORTS 172; 1941 Bill, 43 N C.
ASS'N. REPORTS 114.

BAR
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due publication do they become effective. Thus under the proposed bill
it would be much easier to keep up with changes than under the present
system. Still others said that the new bill was a project of a small
group of lawyers who sought advantage for city lawyers, as against
country lawyers, or for defendants against plaintiffs. For twenty-five
years an influential member of the Senate of the United States frustrated the efforts of the American Bar Association to provide uniform
simple rules for the United States District Court, and he gave similar
reasons for his opposition. 5 Every one should know that every amendment of rules which simplifies procedure deprives a defendant of a technical weapon, and strengthens the armament of the plaintiff, who has
the burden of getting the case into court and to trial and through the
process of trial. Since 1934 the Federal Government and nine states
have followed the course here advocated in a period of our history
when the so-called "vested interests" have had the smallest voice in
government since the Civil War. These arguments are appeals to
prejudice, rather than to reason.
IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVES

If the Supreme Court of North Carolina were given the power to
amend the Code of Civil Procedure, its well-known conservatism
would be sufficient guarantee against any radical or drastic amendments
to the Code. One could expect, without great delay, perhaps in two
years, rules for pretrial procedure, and such like, for which there has
grown up a very large demand, and which have proven their efficacy
elsewhere. One could expect, perhaps, the abolition of the demurrer,
a prolific source of preliminary appeals, and the substitution of the
motion to dismiss, which could be reviewed on appeal only after a trial
on the merits. One could expect a code of rules for administering
estates in receivership, of which there are now practically none. Every
judge who handles a receivership during his six months' term in the
district has to pioneer his way and neither court nor counsel have any
chart or guide. There are many other gaps in our procedural fences,
the closing of which by simple and easily understood rules of court
would be a general benefit. At the 1941 meeting of the North Carolina State Bar a committee was appointed to confer with the Supreme
Court on the modernization of the rules of evidence to eliminate some
of the absurdities of that obsolete structure. One could expect that
the Court would give consideration to a simplification in that field, and
that some short cuts to suit modern conditions of bookkeeping, etc.,
would be studied. The American Law Institute's Code of Evidence
" Dean Pound says "his like is to be found in every law-making body in the
land." Pound, Judicial Councils and Judicial Statistics (1942) 28 AMER. BARh

Ass'-. J. 98.

1942]

TRANSFER OF RULE-MAKING POWER

could be a useful guide in such endeavor to bring court procedure into
line with modem conditions.
The bill, as heretofore submitted to the General Assembly, would
achieve a more useful purpose if it should be amended to authorize the
Supreme Court, with its advisory commission, to act as a judicial council. There would remain outside the general rule-making power certain
matters affecting the operation of the courts which would require legislation. An example is the selection of jurors. This matter is now
regulated by statute and it may be that it could not be dealt with under
the general rule-making power. There is no one now charged with the
duty of making any study of the question of selection of qualified jurors.
This goes to the heart of the jury system. In recent years there has
grown up the idea that every man is qualified to be a juror. This is a
far cry from the traditions of the common-law jury trial, which is
guaranteed in the Constitutions of both the United States and the State
of North Carolina. This problem is not alone a North Carolina problem,
but a national one. The ancient mode of jury selection, as opposed to
the modem "every man system," has found an able and bold champion
in the Hon. Merrill E. Otis, U. S. District Judge, Missouri, who
recently said:
"The idea that jurors should be men above the average entered into
those phrases which are a part of the jury tradition. The jury is not
merely 'twelve men.' It is 'twelve good men and true.' 'Good men !'
That is, 'stout hearted, courageous men.' 'True men !' That is, 'honest,
just, upright' men. When Blackstone said that the jury trial is 'the
glory of the English law,' in the next paragraph he said the juries
should be made up 'of sensible and upright jurymen, chosen by lot
from among those of middle rank.' When Lord Brougham paid the
most famous of all tributes to the jury he did not say: 'All we see
about us, kings, lords and commons, the whole machinery of the state,
all the apparatus of the system and its varied workings, end in simply
bringing twelve average individuals from the mass into a box.' He said
-- 'twelve good men into a box!' The twelve 'good men and'true,' who
demonstrated even in despotic days that the jury can be a bulwark
against tyrants, in what Lord Macaulay has described as the most
notable trial in English history, The Trial of the Seven Bishops, consisted of a baronet, a knight and ten landed proprietors. That jury
stood out against the machinations of King James. Any study of the
cases, whether in England or America, in which the verdicts of juries
have been such as to justify Blackstone's eulogy, will reveal juries of
strong men, intelligent men, men with reputations for justice and courage. Any study of those cases in which shameful verdicts have resulted,
in which tyrants have had their way against the innocent, in which the
-notoriously guilty have escaped just punishment, in which bigotry and
cupidity and prejudice have baffled justice, the study of those cases will
disclose juries of weak, ignorant, inferior men,
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"Every jury in every court should be made up of twelve good men
and true, that is of stout hearted, courageous, honest, just and upright
men. Does the man against whom an unjust criminal charge has been
brought, does the man who has a just claim against another, does the
man against whom an unjust claim is asserted, do these men desire inferior jurors? Not they. The criminal, conscious of his guilt; the
defendant against a meritorious suit for damages, willing to escape by
any chicanery; the fakir, who was not hurt, but sues for damages for
personal -injuries; these and the shysters who go into the lists in their
behalf; they and they alone want juries of inferior men. The only
voice which ever will be heard calling out for low-grade jurors is the
voice of the demagogue who somehow has been admitted to the bar.
And his voice is never a frankly speaking voice. He camouflages his
true intent under such fine words as 'Democracy !,' 'Representative of
the community,' 'Cross-section of society,' 'All men are equal l' He
declaims against 'Packing juries,' against 'Vesting officials with too
much authority,' against 'Judicial tyranny,' against bugaboos which
once were real but which went out with Jeffrys and his ilk long, long
ago.
"The judges of the courts, reputable lawyers, thinking citizens, all
of these wish for juries of reputable and competent individuals. The
common-aw jury was intended to be so constituted. The jury trial
guaranteed by the Constitution was a trial by such a jury as was contemplated by the common law, Blackstone's jury of 'sensible and upright
men.' Nowhere in the common law or old English statutes, nowhere
in the statutes and practices of the thirteen colonies, nowhere in the
constitution and usages of the states before and at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution, was there any recognition of the demagogic theory that every individual is qualified to be a juror. Everywhere there was recognition that jurors for the master panel must be
selected by competent and responsible officials. The only tiirect reference the Constitution makes to the qualifications of jurors is that in
criminal cases they must be 'impartial' and residents of the same state
and district with the accused. The only other reference in the Constitution is indirect. The 'equal protection' clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits an arbitrary and systematic exclusion of great
racial groups. Nothing in the Constitution opposes the wish of the
'good and the just,' if we may be so bold as to employ the phrase made
use of by the Father of His Country, that jurors shall be competent."8 0
The advisory commission should also be authorized to make recommendations to the Supreme Court as to amendment of its own rules.
The Supreme Court already has exclusive power to make its own rules,
but without some such body as an advisory commission to bring to the
court's attention the views of the bar concerning the rules of the
Supreme Court, the court is likely to remain static through the years.
The court's attention could well be called to Rule 10, first adopted by
36 OrIs, SELECTING

FrDERAL COURT JURORS

(Section on Judicial Administration

of the American Bar Association, August, 1942) 12.
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the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, and since by the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit, and, as to cases coming from the Labor Board, by
the Circuit Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Ninth Circuits. The
Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin recently adopted Rule 10,
and other State Supreme Courts are now considering its adoption.
This rule eliminates the narration of the evidence and the printing of
the record on appeal, and provides that counsel print as supplements
to their briefs such parts of the record as they desire the court to read.
The clerk of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Hon. Claude M.
Dean, spoke to the North Carolina Bar Association at Blowing Rock
in June, 1940, on the results of the rule, and practice under it. Enormous printing costs have been saved to litigants and the labors of court
and counsel have been greatly reduced, and all concerned are better
satisfied with the result. This is but an example of the kind of thing
that the advisory commission might do for the benefit of the bar, the
court, and the public.
LONG-RANGE OBJECTIVE

The long-range objective is even more important and greater in
scope. Although comprised of forty-eight states, we are but one nation,
indivisible. Our national integration has progressed rapidly in matters
economic, and in other branches of government, but we are still fortyeight separate and independent kingdoms with respect to the work of
the courts and the legal profession, except as to business in the United
States District Courts. It would be a very great advantage to any
American lawyer to be able to practice both in the Federal courts and
in all state courts by rules substantially the same in both jurisdictions.
In formulating the new Federal rules the objective was to perfect such
a workable system of procedure that it would be adopted eventually by
all the states. Arizona has already taken advantage of the opportunity,
by adopting the Federal rules wholesale, exactly as North Carolina
adopted the Field Code in toto in 1868. If there were a uniform system
of procedure, lawyers would be able to devote less time to procedural
questions, and more to the preparation and trial of cases on their merits.
LOGIC OF THE CASE

The question has so far been considered from the standpoint of
expediency, that is, the public welfare, and the self-interest of the
lawyers. The case is equally strong from the standpoint of principle.
The courts and the bar are held responsible for the quality of their
product, but they have to work with tools provided by the legislative
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department. The power should be placed where the responsibility is
supposed to lie. The judicial depaitment is a co6rdinate branch of
government. It would be as illogical for the legislature to operate
under rules made by the court, as for the judicial system to operate
under rules made by the legislature. Historically all common-law and
equity courts had inherent power to determine how they would proceed. But there was no rule-making authority in the court system having the power to supplant an existing rule in the trial courts. This
situation led to the adoption of legislative codes. It soon became
apparent that a statute is even more of a strait-jacket than the old
court-made rules. Naturally enough, therefore, the present movement
is a swinging back to the courts, but with two significant differences.
Under the plan now making such progress in the country, which has
already proven its worth in other English-speaking nations (in England
since 1873), the rule-making authority vested in the court is an express
authority to enact general rules not by-products of case law, and provision is made for continuous study by an assisting body charged with
the duty of overseeing how rules work out, and comparing results elsewhere. If the courts cannot do the job better than the General Assembly, the future would be dark indeed. We have had seventy-five years
of legislative control, becoming less fit every decade. Under the term
"judicial rule-making" we now include all the talent of the legal profession, brought into play through the advisory committee, which must
give consideration to the views of all who care to express themselves.
That talent found in legislative halls can best serve by opening the way
to revision by the bar through aid afforded the bench.**
GENERAL RULE-MAKING POWER BY STATES
From: "The Rule-Making Power," by Silas A. Harris. Prepared under the
auspices of the Special Committee on Improving the Administration of Justice
of the American Bar Association.
Dormant
Alabama, Power limited to make general equity rules (1935)
Active
Arizona, General rule-making statute (1939)
Dormant
Arkansas, Power limited to rules for Probate Court
California, No general power
Active
Colorado, General statute (1913)
Active
Connecticut, Power limited to certain actions (1905)

Delaware, General statute (1925)
Florida, Power limited to actions pending in Supreme Court
Georgia, Statute giving general power over appellate procedure
vetoed (1941)
Idaho, General power
Illinois, General power
Indiana, General statute (1937)

Iowa, General statute, rules filed with legislature (1941)
Kansas, No general power
Kentucky, No general power. General statute introduced
1942 (Result unknown)
**For general rule-making power by states see Appended Table.

Dormant

Active
Active

Active

1942)
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Louisiana, No general power
Maine, No general power
Maryland, General statute, rules filed with legislature
(1927 and 1939)
Massachusetts, No general power
Michigan, General power by Constitution (1850)
Minnesota, No general power
Mississippi, No general power
Missouri, No general power-Supreme Court advising legislature
Montana, No general power-statute now sponsored by bar
Nebraska, General statute, rules filed with legislature (1939)
Nevada, No general power
New Hampshire, No general power
New Jersey, General statute (1912)
New Mexico, General statute (1933)
New York, No general power
North Carolina, No general power-General statute defeated
in legislature (1939 and 1941)
North Dakota, General statute (1941)
Ohio, No general power-Judicial Council recommending statute
Oklahoma, No general power
Oregon, No general power
Pennsylvania, General statute (1937)
Puerto Rico, General statute (1941)
Rhode Island, General statute (1930)
South Carolina, No general power
South Dakota, General statute (1937-1939)
Tennessee, No general power
Texas, General statute, rules filed with legislature (1939)
Utah, No general power-Ptoposed "rule days" (1928) General
statute defeated 1942
Vermont, No general power
Virginia, Limited power to regulate "rule days" (1928)
Washington, General statute (1925)
West Virginia, General statute (1935)
Wisconsin, General statute (1929)
Wyoming, No general power

Active
Active

Active
Active
Active

Active
Active
Active

Active
Dormant
Active

